mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(): fix buffer overread with stream cipher

With stream ciphers, add a check that there's enough room to read a MAC in
the record. Without this check, subtracting the MAC length from the data
length resulted in an integer underflow, causing the MAC calculation to try
reading (SIZE_MAX + 1 - maclen) bytes of input, which is a buffer overread.

Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2023-09-18 14:08:11 +02:00
parent dc48f6ed27
commit 326ba3c0bb
2 changed files with 15 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Security
* Fix a buffer overread when parsing short TLS application data records in
ARC4 or null-cipher cipher suites. Credit to OSS-Fuzz.

View File

@ -1149,6 +1149,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) {
if (rec->data_len < transform->maclen) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1,
("Record too short for MAC:"
" %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
rec->data_len, transform->maclen));
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
}
padlen = 0;
if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec,
transform->iv_dec,
@ -1561,7 +1569,7 @@ hmac_failed_etm_enabled:
unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 };
unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 };
/* If the initial value of padlen was such that
/* For CBC+MAC, If the initial value of padlen was such that
* data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen
* got reset to 1, and the initial check
* data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1
@ -1573,6 +1581,9 @@ hmac_failed_etm_enabled:
* subtracted either padlen + 1 (if the padding was correct)
* or 0 (if the padding was incorrect) since then,
* hence data_len >= maclen in any case.
*
* For stream ciphers, we checked above that
* data_len >= maclen.
*/
rec->data_len -= transform->maclen;
ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec,