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Threat Model: reorganise threat definitions
Simplify organisation by placing threat definitions in their respective sections. Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
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SECURITY.md
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SECURITY.md
@ -23,17 +23,12 @@ Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.
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We use the following classification of attacks:
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We use the following classification of attacks:
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- **Remote Attacks:** The attacker can observe and modify data sent over the
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network. This includes observing the content and timing of individual packets,
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as well as suppressing or delaying legitimate messages, and injecting messages.
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- **Timing Attacks:** The attacker can gain information about the time taken
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by certain sets of instructions in Mbed TLS operations.
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- **Physical Attacks:** The attacker has access to physical information about
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the hardware Mbed TLS is running on and/or can alter the physical state of
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the hardware.
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### Remote attacks
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### Remote attacks
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The attacker can observe and modify data sent over the network. This includes
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observing the content and timing of individual packets, as well as suppressing
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or delaying legitimate messages, and injecting messages.
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Mbed TLS aims to fully protect against remote attacks and to enable the user
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Mbed TLS aims to fully protect against remote attacks and to enable the user
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application in providing full protection against remote attacks. Said
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application in providing full protection against remote attacks. Said
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protection is limited to providing security guarantees offered by the protocol
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protection is limited to providing security guarantees offered by the protocol
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@ -42,6 +37,9 @@ arrive without delay, as the TLS protocol doesn't guarantee that either.)
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### Timing attacks
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### Timing attacks
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The attacker can gain information about the time taken by certain sets of
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instructions in Mbed TLS operations.
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Mbed TLS provides limited protection against timing attacks. The cost of
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Mbed TLS provides limited protection against timing attacks. The cost of
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protecting against timing attacks widely varies depending on the granularity of
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protecting against timing attacks widely varies depending on the granularity of
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the measurements and the noise present. Therefore the protection in Mbed TLS is
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the measurements and the noise present. Therefore the protection in Mbed TLS is
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@ -71,6 +69,9 @@ Guide](docs/architecture/alternative-implementations.md) for more information.
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### Physical attacks
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### Physical attacks
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The attacker has access to physical information about the hardware Mbed TLS is
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running on and/or can alter the physical state of the hardware.
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Physical attacks are out of scope (eg. power analysis or radio emissions). Any
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Physical attacks are out of scope (eg. power analysis or radio emissions). Any
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attack using information about or influencing the physical state of the
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attack using information about or influencing the physical state of the
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hardware is considered physical, independently of the attack vector. (For
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hardware is considered physical, independently of the attack vector. (For
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