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fix various issues

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Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu <jerry.h.yu@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jerry Yu 2021-10-29 11:09:06 +08:00
parent 0b32c502a4
commit d0fc585b7e
1 changed files with 17 additions and 16 deletions
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33
library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
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@ -221,14 +221,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* /*
* STATE HANDLING: Read CertificateVerify * STATE HANDLING: Read CertificateVerify
*/ */
/* Macro to express the length of the verify structure length. /* Macro to express the maximum length of the verify structure.
* *
* The structure is computed per TLS 1.3 specification as: * The structure is computed per TLS 1.3 specification as:
* - 64 bytes of octet 32, * - 64 bytes of octet 32,
* - 33 bytes for the context string * - 33 bytes for the context string
* (which is either "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify" * (which is either "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"
* or "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"), * or "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"),
* - 1 byte for the octet 0x0, which servers as a separator, * - 1 byte for the octet 0x0, which serves as a separator,
* - 32 or 48 bytes for the Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate) * - 32 or 48 bytes for the Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate)
* (depending on the size of the transcript_hash) * (depending on the size of the transcript_hash)
* *
@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* The caller has to ensure that the buffer has size at least * The caller has to ensure that the buffer has size at least
* SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE bytes. * SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE bytes.
*/ */
static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( unsigned char *transcript_hash, static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( const unsigned char *transcript_hash,
size_t transcript_hash_len, size_t transcript_hash_len,
unsigned char *verify_buffer, unsigned char *verify_buffer,
size_t *verify_buffer_len, size_t *verify_buffer_len,
@ -291,23 +291,24 @@ static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure( unsigned char *transcript_hash,
*verify_buffer_len = idx; *verify_buffer_len = idx;
} }
static int ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_offered( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t sig_alg ) static int ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_offered( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
uint16_t sig_alg )
{ {
const uint16_t *tls13_sig_alg = ssl->conf->tls13_sig_algs; const uint16_t *tls13_sig_alg = ssl->conf->tls13_sig_algs;
for( ; *tls13_sig_alg !=MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE ; tls13_sig_alg++ ) for( ; *tls13_sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS13_SIG_NONE ; tls13_sig_alg++ )
{ {
if( *tls13_sig_alg == sig_alg ) if( *tls13_sig_alg == sig_alg )
return 1; return( 1 );
} }
return 0; return( 0 );
} }
static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end, const unsigned char *end,
const unsigned char *verify_buffer, const unsigned char *verify_buffer,
size_t verify_buffer_len ) size_t verify_buffer_len )
{ {
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const unsigned char *p = buf; const unsigned char *p = buf;
@ -315,7 +316,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t signature_len; size_t signature_len;
mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg; mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
unsigned char verify_hash[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char verify_hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t verify_hash_len; size_t verify_hash_len;
/* /*
@ -340,7 +341,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* certificates and decides to abort the handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake * certificates and decides to abort the handshake, then it MUST abort the handshake
* with an appropriate certificate-related alert (by default, "unsupported_certificate"). * with an appropriate certificate-related alert (by default, "unsupported_certificate").
* *
* Check if algorithm in offered signature algorithms. Send `unsupported_certificate` * Check if algorithm is an offered signature algorithm. Send `unsupported_certificate`
* alert message on failure. * alert message on failure.
*/ */
if( ! ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, algorithm ) ) if( ! ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, algorithm ) )
@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE ); MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
} }
/* We currently only support ECDSA-based signatures */ /* We currently only support ECDSA-based signatures */
@ -441,7 +442,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( sig_alg, NULL, if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( sig_alg, NULL,
&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len, md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len,
buf, signature_len ) ) != 0 ) p, signature_len ) ) != 0 )
{ {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify_ext", ret ); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify_ext", ret );
@ -455,7 +456,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return( ret ); return( ret );
} }
return( ret ); return( 0 );
} }
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */