diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/psa-crypto-new-wildcard-policies.txt b/ChangeLog.d/psa-crypto-new-wildcard-policies.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..56fbbc9b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/psa-crypto-new-wildcard-policies.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +Features + * In the PSA API, the policy for a MAC or AEAD algorithm can specify a + minimum MAC or tag length thanks to the new wildcards + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC and + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG. diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h index 271fb99fa..78c6e3d1e 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto.h @@ -264,6 +264,14 @@ static psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags( * - An algorithm value permits this particular algorithm. * - An algorithm wildcard built from #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH allows the specified * signature scheme with any hash algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC allows + * any MAC algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CMAC) which + * generates/verifies a MAC length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. + * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG + * allows any AEAD algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CCM) which + * generates/verifies a tag length greater than or equal to the length + * encoded in the wildcard algorithm. * * This function overwrites any algorithm policy * previously set in \p attributes. diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/include/psa/crypto_values.h index 7002631a1..a17bfc2bf 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_values.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_values.h @@ -866,6 +866,14 @@ #define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) #define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16 +/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or + * equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00008000) + /** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm. * * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC @@ -899,8 +907,9 @@ * MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. */ -#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \ - (((mac_alg) & ~PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) | \ +#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \ + (((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK)) /** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated @@ -915,8 +924,9 @@ * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported * MAC algorithm. */ -#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \ - ((mac_alg) & ~PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) +#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \ + ((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) /** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated. * @@ -932,6 +942,34 @@ #define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \ (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET) +/** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC + * length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard + * algorithm's minimum MAC length. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the + * smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg) + * is true). + * \param min_mac_length Desired minimum length of the message authentication + * code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated + * length of the MAC and must be at least 1. + * + * \return The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC + * algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or + * too large for the specified MAC algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \ + ( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00000) /** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher * @@ -1092,6 +1130,14 @@ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t)0x003f0000) #define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16 +/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to + * #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm + * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted + * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the + * same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one + * encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x00008000) + /** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm. * * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD @@ -1111,10 +1157,26 @@ * for the specified AEAD algorithm. */ #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \ - (((aead_alg) & ~PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) | \ + (((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \ ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \ PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK)) +/** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) + * is true). + * + * \return The tag length specified by the input algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid + * for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \ + (((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> \ + PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET ) + /** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length. * * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that @@ -1134,6 +1196,34 @@ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ? \ ref : +/** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm. + * + * A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms + * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific + * algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the + * wildcard algorithm. + * + * \note When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the + * smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively + * becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm. + * + * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type + * #psa_algorithm_t such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true). + * \param min_tag_length Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in + * bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest + * allowed tag length of the algorithm. + * + * \return The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the + * specified minimum length. + * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported + * AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1 + * or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \ + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) | \ + PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x06000200) /** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing. * @@ -1580,9 +1670,13 @@ * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported * algorithm identifier. */ -#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \ - (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ - PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \ + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \ + (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \ (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) /**@}*/ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 8a51e9969..57053efb0 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -545,6 +545,47 @@ static inline size_t psa_get_key_slot_bits( const psa_key_slot_t *slot ) return( slot->attr.bits ); } +/** Check whether a given key type is valid for use with a given MAC algorithm + * + * Upon successful return of this function, the behavior of #PSA_MAC_LENGTH + * when called with the validated \p algorithm and \p key_type is well-defined. + * + * \param[in] algorithm The specific MAC algorithm (can be wildcard). + * \param[in] key_type The key type of the key to be used with the + * \p algorithm. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The \p key_type is valid for use with the \p algorithm + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The \p key_type is not valid for use with the \p algorithm + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type ) +{ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( algorithm ) ) + { + if( key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + + if( PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC( algorithm ) ) + { + /* Check that we're calling PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH with a cipher + * key. */ + if( ( key_type & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ) == + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ) + { + /* PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH returns 1 for stream ciphers and + * the block length (larger than 1) for block ciphers. */ + if( PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH( key_type ) > 1 ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + /** Try to allocate a buffer to an empty key slot. * * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to attach buffer to. @@ -657,6 +698,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( * Return 0 (which allows no operation) on incompatibility. */ static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( + psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t alg1, psa_algorithm_t alg2 ) { @@ -674,11 +716,92 @@ static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( if( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg2 ) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ) return( alg1 ); } + /* If the policies are from the same AEAD family, check whether + * one of them is a minimum-tag-length wildcard. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( alg2 ) && + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg1, 0 ) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg2, 0 ) ) ) + { + size_t alg1_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg1 ); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg2 ); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + alg1, restricted_len ) ); + } + /* If only one is a wildcard, return specific algorithm if compatible. */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ) + { + return( alg2 ); + } + if( ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ) + { + return( alg1 ); + } + } + /* If the policies are from the same MAC family, check whether one + * of them is a minimum-MAC-length policy. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg1 ) && PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( alg2 ) && + ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg1 ) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg2 ) ) ) + { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the base + * algorithm of alg1 and alg2 are the same, we only need this once. */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( alg1, key_type ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Get the (exact or at-least) output lengths for both sides of the + * requested intersection. None of the currently supported algorithms + * have an output length dependent on the actual key size, so setting it + * to a bogus value of 0 is currently OK. + * + * Note that for at-least-this-length wildcard algorithms, the output + * length is set to the shortest allowed length, which allows us to + * calculate the most restrictive tag length for the intersection. */ + size_t alg1_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg1 ); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, 0, alg2 ); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if( ( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) && + ( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg1, restricted_len ) ); + } + + /* If only one is an at-least-this-length policy, the intersection would + * be the other (fixed-length) policy as long as said fixed length is + * equal to or larger than the shortest allowed length. */ + if( ( alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( ( alg1_len <= alg2_len ) ? alg2 : 0 ); + } + if( ( alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( ( alg2_len <= alg1_len ) ? alg1 : 0 ); + } + + /* If none of them are wildcards, check whether they define the same tag + * length. This is still possible here when one is default-length and + * the other specific-length. Ensure to always return the + * specific-length version for the intersection. */ + if( alg1_len == alg2_len ) + return( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg1, alg1_len ) ); + } /* If the policies are incompatible, allow nothing. */ return( 0 ); } -static int psa_key_algorithm_permits( psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, +static int psa_key_algorithm_permits( psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, psa_algorithm_t requested_alg ) { /* Common case: the policy only allows requested_alg. */ @@ -693,6 +816,63 @@ static int psa_key_algorithm_permits( psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, return( ( policy_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) == ( requested_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ) ); } + /* If policy_alg is a wildcard AEAD algorithm of the same base as + * the requested algorithm, check the requested tag length to be + * equal-length or longer than the wildcard-specified length. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD( requested_alg ) && + ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, 0 ) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( requested_alg, 0 ) ) && + ( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) ) + { + return( PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( requested_alg ) ); + } + /* If policy_alg is a MAC algorithm of the same base as the requested + * algorithm, check whether their MAC lengths are compatible. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( policy_alg ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC( requested_alg ) && + ( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg ) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ) ) + { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the policy + * and requested algorithms are the same, we only need this once. */ + if( PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do( policy_alg, key_type ) ) + return( 0 ); + + /* Get both the requested output length for the algorithm which is to be + * verified, and the default output length for the base algorithm. + * Note that none of the currently supported algorithms have an output + * length dependent on actual key size, so setting it to a bogus value + * of 0 is currently OK. */ + size_t requested_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, requested_alg ); + size_t default_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( requested_alg ) ); + + /* If the policy is default-length, only allow an algorithm with + * a declared exact-length matching the default. */ + if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == 0 ) + return( requested_output_length == default_output_length ); + + /* If the requested algorithm is default-length, allow it if the policy + * length exactly matches the default length. */ + if( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( requested_alg ) == 0 && + PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) == default_output_length ) + { + return( 1 ); + } + + /* If policy_alg is an at-least-this-length wildcard MAC algorithm, + * check for the requested MAC length to be equal to or longer than the + * minimum allowed length. */ + if( ( policy_alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) != 0 ) + { + return( PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( policy_alg ) <= + requested_output_length ); + } + } /* If policy_alg is a generic key agreement operation, then using it for * a key derivation with that key agreement should also be allowed. This * behaviour is expected to be defined in a future specification version. */ @@ -702,23 +882,52 @@ static int psa_key_algorithm_permits( psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, return( PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE( requested_alg ) == policy_alg ); } - /* If it isn't permitted, it's forbidden. */ + /* If it isn't explicitly permitted, it's forbidden. */ return( 0 ); } /** Test whether a policy permits an algorithm. * * The caller must test usage flags separately. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being validated, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \retval PSA_SUCCESS When \p alg is a specific algorithm + * allowed by the \p policy. + * \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT When \p alg is not a specific algorithm + * \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED When \p alg is a specific algorithm, but + * the \p policy does not allow it. */ -static int psa_key_policy_permits( const psa_key_policy_t *policy, - psa_algorithm_t alg ) +static psa_status_t psa_key_policy_permits( const psa_key_policy_t *policy, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) { - return( psa_key_algorithm_permits( policy->alg, alg ) || - psa_key_algorithm_permits( policy->alg2, alg ) ); + /* '0' is not a valid algorithm */ + if( alg == 0 ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + /* A requested algorithm cannot be a wildcard. */ + if( PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD( alg ) ) + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + + if( psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg, alg ) || + psa_key_algorithm_permits( key_type, policy->alg2, alg ) ) + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); } /** Restrict a key policy based on a constraint. * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being restricted, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \param[in] key_type The key type for which to restrict the policy * \param[in,out] policy The policy to restrict. * \param[in] constraint The policy constraint to apply. * @@ -726,17 +935,20 @@ static int psa_key_policy_permits( const psa_key_policy_t *policy, * \c *policy contains the intersection of the original value of * \c *policy and \c *constraint. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT - * \c *policy and \c *constraint are incompatible. + * \c key_type, \c *policy and \c *constraint are incompatible. * \c *policy is unchanged. */ static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( + psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_key_policy_t *policy, const psa_key_policy_t *constraint ) { psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg = - psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( policy->alg, constraint->alg ); + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg, + constraint->alg ); psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg2 = - psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( policy->alg2, constraint->alg2 ); + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( key_type, policy->alg2, + constraint->alg2 ); if( intersection_alg == 0 && policy->alg != 0 && constraint->alg != 0 ) return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); if( intersection_alg2 == 0 && policy->alg2 != 0 && constraint->alg2 != 0 ) @@ -751,7 +963,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( * and lock it. * * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is - * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. + * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is + * zero, the algorithm is not checked. * * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key * into a key slot if not already done. @@ -780,13 +993,21 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY( slot->attr.type ) ) usage &= ~PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; if( ( slot->attr.policy.usage & usage ) != usage ) + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; goto error; + } /* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algortihm. */ - if( alg != 0 && ! psa_key_policy_permits( &slot->attr.policy, alg ) ) - goto error; + if( alg != 0 ) + { + status = psa_key_policy_permits( &slot->attr.policy, + slot->attr.type, + alg ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto error; + } return( PSA_SUCCESS ); @@ -1880,7 +2101,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) goto exit; - status = psa_restrict_key_policy( &actual_attributes.core.policy, + status = psa_restrict_key_policy( source_slot->attr.type, + &actual_attributes.core.policy, &source_slot->attr.policy ); if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) goto exit; @@ -2553,7 +2775,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_init( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - operation->alg = alg; + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ); operation->key_set = 0; operation->iv_set = 0; operation->iv_required = 0; @@ -2561,7 +2783,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_init( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, operation->is_sign = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) - if( alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) { operation->iv_required = 0; mbedtls_cipher_init( &operation->ctx.cmac ); @@ -2645,23 +2867,26 @@ bad_state: } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) -static int psa_cmac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, - size_t key_bits, - psa_key_slot_t *slot, - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info ) +static psa_status_t psa_cmac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_slot_t *slot ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - operation->mac_size = cipher_info->block_size; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( PSA_ALG_CMAC, + slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits, + NULL ); + if( cipher_info == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup( &operation->ctx.cmac, cipher_info ); if( ret != 0 ) - return( ret ); + goto exit; ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts( &operation->ctx.cmac, slot->key.data, - key_bits ); - return( ret ); + slot->attr.bits ); +exit: + return( mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ) ); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ @@ -2737,11 +2962,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_slot_t *slot; - size_t key_bits; psa_key_usage_t usage = is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; - uint8_t truncated = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( alg ); - psa_algorithm_t full_length_alg = PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ); /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ if( operation->alg != 0 ) @@ -2749,7 +2971,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); } - status = psa_mac_init( operation, full_length_alg ); + status = psa_mac_init( operation, alg ); if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) return( status ); if( is_sign ) @@ -2759,40 +2981,48 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, key, &slot, usage, alg ); if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) goto exit; - key_bits = psa_get_key_slot_bits( slot ); + + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm */ + status = psa_mac_key_can_do( alg, slot->attr.type ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + goto exit; + + /* Get the output length for the algorithm and key combination. None of the + * currently supported algorithms have an output length dependent on actual + * key size, so setting it to a bogus value is currently OK. */ + operation->mac_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, 0, alg ); + + if( operation->mac_size < 4 ) + { + /* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be + * brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist, + * so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still + * too small for security. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + if( operation->mac_size > + PSA_MAC_LENGTH( slot->attr.type, 0, PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) ) ) + { + /* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length than the full length + * of the algorithm. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } #if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) - if( full_length_alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) + if( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( alg ) == PSA_ALG_CMAC ) { - const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = - mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( full_length_alg, - slot->attr.type, key_bits, NULL ); - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if( cipher_info == NULL ) - { - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - goto exit; - } - operation->mac_size = cipher_info->block_size; - ret = psa_cmac_setup( operation, key_bits, slot, cipher_info ); - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( ret ); + status = psa_cmac_setup( operation, slot ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) - if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( full_length_alg ) ) + if( PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC( alg ) ) { - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg ); - if( hash_alg == 0 ) - { - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - goto exit; - } - - operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg ); /* Sanity check. This shouldn't fail on a valid configuration. */ - if( operation->mac_size == 0 || - operation->mac_size > sizeof( operation->ctx.hmac.opad ) ) + if( operation->mac_size > sizeof( operation->ctx.hmac.opad ) ) { status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto exit; @@ -2807,35 +3037,14 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup( psa_mac_operation_t *operation, status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &operation->ctx.hmac, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, - hash_alg ); + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH( alg ) ); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ { - (void) key_bits; status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } - if( truncated == 0 ) - { - /* The "normal" case: untruncated algorithm. Nothing to do. */ - } - else if( truncated < 4 ) - { - /* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be - * brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist, - * so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still - * too small for security. */ - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - else if( truncated > operation->mac_size ) - { - /* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length. */ - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - } - else - operation->mac_size = truncated; - exit: if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) { diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h b/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h index be127d9f8..1e5a40711 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #endif #include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "common.h" #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" @@ -76,4 +77,10 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( void (* entropy_free )( mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx ) ); #endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c b/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c index 6b0c0b27a..f797c027f 100644 --- a/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c +++ b/programs/psa/psa_constant_names_generated.c @@ -150,7 +150,11 @@ static int psa_snprint_algorithm(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, unsigned long length_modifier = NO_LENGTH_MODIFIER; if (PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg)) { core_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(alg, 0); - if (core_alg != alg) { + if (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(", 33); + length_modifier = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg); + } else if (core_alg != alg) { append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(", 22); length_modifier = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg); @@ -160,6 +164,10 @@ static int psa_snprint_algorithm(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, if (core_alg == 0) { /* For unknown AEAD algorithms, there is no "default tag length". */ core_alg = alg; + } else if (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(", 43); + length_modifier = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg); } else if (core_alg != alg) { append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(", 32); diff --git a/scripts/generate_psa_constants.py b/scripts/generate_psa_constants.py index 01c5a32a1..d0d1f3f49 100755 --- a/scripts/generate_psa_constants.py +++ b/scripts/generate_psa_constants.py @@ -100,7 +100,11 @@ static int psa_snprint_algorithm(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, unsigned long length_modifier = NO_LENGTH_MODIFIER; if (PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg)) { core_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(alg, 0); - if (core_alg != alg) { + if (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(", 33); + length_modifier = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg); + } else if (core_alg != alg) { append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(", 22); length_modifier = PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg); @@ -110,6 +114,10 @@ static int psa_snprint_algorithm(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, if (core_alg == 0) { /* For unknown AEAD algorithms, there is no "default tag length". */ core_alg = alg; + } else if (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) { + append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, + "PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(", 43); + length_modifier = PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(alg); } else if (core_alg != alg) { append(&buffer, buffer_size, &required_size, "PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(", 32); diff --git a/tests/scripts/set_psa_test_dependencies.py b/tests/scripts/set_psa_test_dependencies.py index 7a84cf4d8..e37ce3db5 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/set_psa_test_dependencies.py +++ b/tests/scripts/set_psa_test_dependencies.py @@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ WITHOUT_SYSTEMATIC_DEPENDENCIES = frozenset([ 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE', # not a real key type 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE', # always supported, don't list it to reduce noise 'PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA', # always supported, don't list it to reduce noise + 'PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC', #only a modifier + 'PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG', #only a modifier # Not implemented yet: cipher-related key types and algorithms. # Manually extracted from crypto_values.h. diff --git a/tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py b/tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py index 537f9e94e..9e8d7f8f4 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py +++ b/tests/scripts/test_psa_constant_names.py @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ class Inputs: # PSA_ALG_IS_xxx macros, but are also not currently assigned and are # not likely to be assigned in the near future. self.hash_algorithms = set(['0x020000fe']) # 0x020000ff is PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH - self.mac_algorithms = set(['0x0300ffff']) + self.mac_algorithms = set(['0x03007fff']) self.ka_algorithms = set(['0x09fc0000']) self.kdf_algorithms = set(['0x080000ff']) # For AEAD algorithms, the only variability is over the tag length, @@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ class Inputs: self.arguments_for = { 'mac_length': ['1', '63'], 'tag_length': ['1', '63'], + 'min_mac_length': ['1', '63'], + 'min_tag_length': ['1', '63'], } def get_names(self, type_word): diff --git a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c index 9f80d7b65..a4f87eb2c 100644 --- a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c +++ b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c @@ -122,6 +122,12 @@ static int exercise_mac_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, unsigned char mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = {0}; size_t mac_length = sizeof( mac ); + /* Convert wildcard algorithm to exercisable algorithm */ + if( alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + { + alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH( alg ) ); + } + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) { PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, alg ) ); @@ -236,6 +242,12 @@ static int exercise_aead_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, size_t ciphertext_length = sizeof( ciphertext ); size_t plaintext_length = sizeof( ciphertext ); + /* Convert wildcard algorithm to exercisable algorithm */ + if( alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ) + { + alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH( alg ) ); + } + /* Default IV length for AES-GCM is 12 bytes */ if( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 0 ) == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_GCM, 0 ) ) @@ -243,6 +255,13 @@ static int exercise_aead_key( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, nonce_length = 12; } + /* IV length for CCM needs to be between 7 and 13 bytes */ + if( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 0 ) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( PSA_ALG_CCM, 0 ) ) + { + nonce_length = 12; + } + if( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) { PSA_ASSERT( psa_aead_encrypt( key, alg, diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index ad34bad3d..3824fa09b 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -378,31 +378,95 @@ key_attributes_init: PSA key policy: MAC, sign | verify depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC -mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS PSA key policy: MAC, wrong algorithm depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC -mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224) +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED PSA key policy: MAC, alg=0 in policy depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC -mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED PSA key policy: MAC, ANY_HASH in policy is not meaningful depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC -mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED PSA key policy: MAC, sign but not verify depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC -mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS PSA key policy: MAC, verify but not sign depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC -mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS PSA key policy: MAC, neither sign nor verify depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC -mac_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +mac_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length > min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 30):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length = min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length < min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: CMAC, sign-verify, tag length > min-length policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 16):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: CMAC, sign-verify, tag length = min-length policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: CMAC, sign-verify, tag length < min-length policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 8):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, default tag length > min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 31):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, default tag length = min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 32):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, default tag length < min-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 33):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy, unmatched base alg +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_CMAC, 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy, unmatched base alg (different hash base) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_224), 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy, unmatched base alg (different algorithm) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, min-length policy used as algorithm +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length > exact-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length = exact-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: HMAC, sign-verify, tag length < exact-length policy +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +mac_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 10):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED PSA key policy: cipher, encrypt | decrypt depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR @@ -430,27 +494,83 @@ cipher_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_A PSA key policy: AEAD, encrypt | decrypt depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C -aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS PSA key policy: AEAD, wrong algorithm depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C -aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":16:16:PSA_ALG_GCM +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":16:16:PSA_ALG_GCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED PSA key policy: AEAD, alg=0 in policy depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C -aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":16:16:PSA_ALG_CCM +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":16:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED PSA key policy: AEAD, encrypt but not decrypt depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C -aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS PSA key policy: AEAD, decrypt but not encrypt depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C -aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS PSA key policy: AEAD, neither encrypt nor decrypt depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C -aead_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM +aead_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length > min-length policy, CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:8:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length = min-length policy, CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length < min-length policy, CCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length > min-length policy, GCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":12:8:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 8):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length = min-length policy, GCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":12:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length < min-length policy, GCM +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":12:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, default tag length > min-length policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, default tag length = min-length policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 16):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, default tag length < min-length policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 17):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:16:PSA_ALG_CCM:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, min-length policy, unmatched base alg +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, min-length policy used as algorithm +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:8:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length > exact-length policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:8:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length = exact-length policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key policy: AEAD, tag length < exact-length policy +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":13:4:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, encrypt | decrypt depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR @@ -698,6 +818,78 @@ Copy fail: AES, incompatible target policy depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CTR:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC length > min-length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0 + +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC length = min-length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0 + +Copy fail: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC length < min-length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 16):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC min-length, src > tgt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0 + +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC min-length, src = tgt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0 + +Copy key: source=MAC min-length, target=MAC min-length, src < tgt +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0 + +Copy fail: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length > length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 24):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length = length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0 + +Copy key: source=MAC, target=MAC min-length < length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 16):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), 20):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length > min-length +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length = min-length +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0 + +Copy fail: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD length < min-length +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src > tgt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src = tgt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD min-length, target=AEAD min-length, src < tgt +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy fail: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length > length +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 4):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +Copy key: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length = length +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0 + +Copy key: source=AEAD, target=AEAD min-length < length +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_C +copy_success:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8):0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 12):0 + Copy fail: RSA, incompatible target policy (source wildcard) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C copy_fail:PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT @@ -893,9 +1085,14 @@ PSA MAC setup: good, AES-CMAC depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_SUCCESS -PSA MAC setup: bad algorithm (unknown MAC algorithm) +PSA MAC setup: bad algorithm (HMAC without specified hash) +# Either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED would be reasonable here mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(0):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED +PSA MAC setup: bad algorithm (unsupported HMAC hash algorithm) +depends_on:!PSA_WANT_ALG_MD2 +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f":PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_MD2):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + PSA MAC setup: bad algorithm (not a MAC algorithm) depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT @@ -915,7 +1112,7 @@ mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161 PSA MAC setup: incompatible key HMAC for CMAC depends_on:MBEDTLS_CMAC_C # Either INVALID_ARGUMENT or NOT_SUPPORTED would be reasonable here -mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED +mac_setup:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:"000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f":PSA_ALG_CMAC:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA MAC setup: algorithm known but not supported, long key depends_on:!MBEDTLS_MD5_C @@ -1926,9 +2123,7 @@ sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082025e02010002818100af057d396ee84fb75fdbb PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, invalid hash (wildcard) depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 -# Arguably the error should be INVALID_ARGUMENT, but NOT_SUPPORTED is simpler -# to implement. -sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":128:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED +sign_fail:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":128:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA sign: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 raw, input too large depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_MD_C diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function index fde4a9b0b..55b941676 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -834,12 +834,14 @@ void mac_key_policy( int policy_usage, int policy_alg, int key_type, data_t *key_data, - int exercise_alg ) + int exercise_alg, + int expected_status_arg ) { mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; unsigned char mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; PSA_ASSERT( psa_crypto_init( ) ); @@ -852,20 +854,19 @@ void mac_key_policy( int policy_usage, &key ) ); status = psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation, key, exercise_alg ); - if( policy_alg == exercise_alg && - ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) != 0 ) - PSA_ASSERT( status ); - else + if( ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ) == 0 ) TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); + psa_mac_abort( &operation ); memset( mac, 0, sizeof( mac ) ); status = psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation, key, exercise_alg ); - if( policy_alg == exercise_alg && - ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) != 0 ) - PSA_ASSERT( status ); - else + if( ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ) == 0 ) TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + else + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); exit: psa_mac_abort( &operation ); @@ -924,11 +925,13 @@ void aead_key_policy( int policy_usage, data_t *key_data, int nonce_length_arg, int tag_length_arg, - int exercise_alg ) + int exercise_alg, + int expected_status_arg ) { mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t expected_status = expected_status_arg; unsigned char nonce[16] = {0}; size_t nonce_length = nonce_length_arg; unsigned char tag[16]; @@ -953,9 +956,8 @@ void aead_key_policy( int policy_usage, NULL, 0, tag, tag_length, &output_length ); - if( policy_alg == exercise_alg && - ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) != 0 ) - PSA_ASSERT( status ); + if( ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ) != 0 ) + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); else TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); @@ -966,11 +968,12 @@ void aead_key_policy( int policy_usage, tag, tag_length, NULL, 0, &output_length ); - if( policy_alg == exercise_alg && - ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ) != 0 ) + if( ( policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ) == 0 ) + TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + else if( expected_status == PSA_SUCCESS ) TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ); else - TEST_EQUAL( status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); + TEST_EQUAL( status, expected_status ); exit: psa_destroy_key( key ); @@ -1334,6 +1337,7 @@ void copy_success( int source_usage_arg, ASSERT_COMPARE( material->x, material->len, export_buffer, length ); } + if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( target_key, expected_usage, expected_alg ) ) goto exit; if( ! mbedtls_test_psa_exercise_key( target_key, expected_usage, expected_alg2 ) ) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function index 4b55da1ed..4bf56352b 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_metadata.function @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #endif #include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" /* Flags for algorithm classification macros. There is a flag for every * algorithm classification macro PSA_ALG_IS_xxx except for the @@ -158,6 +159,10 @@ void mac_algorithm_core( psa_algorithm_t alg, int classification_flags, /* Length */ TEST_EQUAL( length, PSA_MAC_LENGTH( key_type, key_bits, alg ) ); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_mac_key_can_do( alg, key_type ) ); +#endif + exit: ; } @@ -263,6 +268,52 @@ void mac_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags, PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length - 1) ); TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( truncated_alg, length ), PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length ) ); + + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC on an algorithm + * earlier constructed with PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC gives the + * length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is smaller + * than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( truncated_alg, n ), 1 ), + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( truncated_alg, n ), length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( truncated_alg, n ), length ), + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( alg, length ) ); + } + + /* At-leat-this-length versions */ + for( n = 1; n <= length; n++ ) + { + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg = PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, n ); + mac_algorithm_core( policy_alg, classification_flags | ALG_IS_WILDCARD, + key_type, key_bits, n ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg ), alg ); + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC twice gives the + * length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is smaller + * than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg, 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg, length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( policy_alg, length ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, length ) ); + + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC on an algorithm + * earlier constructed with PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC gives the length of + * the outer truncation (even if the outer length is smaller than the + * inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( policy_alg, n ), 1), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( policy_alg, n ), length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( + PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC( policy_alg, n ), length ), + PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC( alg, length ) ); } } /* END_CASE */ @@ -329,7 +380,7 @@ void aead_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags, aead_algorithm_core( truncated_alg, classification_flags, n ); TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG( truncated_alg ), alg ); - /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG twice gives + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG twice gives * the length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is * smaller than the inner length). */ TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( truncated_alg, 1 ), @@ -338,6 +389,52 @@ void aead_algorithm( int alg_arg, int classification_flags, PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, tag_length - 1) ); TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( truncated_alg, tag_length ), PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, tag_length ) ); + + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG on an algorithm + * earlier constructed with PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG + * gives the length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is + * smaller than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( truncated_alg, n ), 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( truncated_alg, n ), tag_length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, tag_length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( truncated_alg, n ), tag_length ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( alg, tag_length ) ); + } + + /* At-leat-this-length versions */ + for( n = 1; n <= tag_length; n++ ) + { + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, n ); + aead_algorithm_core( policy_alg, classification_flags | ALG_IS_WILDCARD, n ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG( policy_alg ), + alg ); + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG twice + * gives the length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is + * smaller than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( policy_alg, 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( policy_alg, tag_length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, tag_length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( policy_alg, tag_length ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, tag_length ) ); + + /* Check that calling PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG on an + * algorithm earlier constructed with PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG + * gives the length of the outer truncation (even if the outer length is + * smaller than the inner length). */ + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, n ), 1), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, 1 ) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, n ), tag_length - 1 ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, tag_length - 1) ); + TEST_EQUAL( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG( policy_alg, n ), tag_length ), + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( alg, tag_length ) ); } } /* END_CASE */