Add entropy callbacks to HMAC_DRBG

include/polarssl/hmac_drbg.h

@@ -29,19 +29,40 @@
 
 #include "md.h"
 
+/*
+ * ! Same values as ctr_drbg.h !
+ */
+#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED        -0x0034  /**< The entropy source failed. */
+#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG              -0x0036  /**< Too many random requested in single call. */
+#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG                -0x0038  /**< Input too large (Entropy + additional). */
+#define POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR                -0x003A  /**< Read/write error in file. */
+
+#define HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL   10000   /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */
+#define HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT         256     /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */
+#define HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST       1024    /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */
+#define HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT    384     /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */
+
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
-/*
+/**
- * Simplified HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * HMAC_DRBG context.
- * No reseed counter, no prediction resistance flag.
+ * TODO: reseed counter, prediction resistance flag.
  */
 typedef struct
 {
     md_context_t md_ctx;
     unsigned char V[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
     unsigned char K[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+
+    size_t entropy_len;         /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */
+
+    /*
+     * Callbacks (Entropy)
+     */
+    int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t);
+    void *p_entropy;            /*!< context for the entropy function */
 } hmac_drbg_context;
 
 /**
@@ -49,16 +70,45 @@ typedef struct
  *
  * \param ctx           HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised
  * \param md_info       MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG
- * \param data          Concatenation of entropy string and additional data
+ * \param f_entropy     Entropy callback (p_entropy, buffer to fill, buffer
- * \param data_len      Length of data in bytes
+ *                      length)
+ * \param p_entropy     Entropy context
+ * \param custom        Personalization data (Device specific identifiers)
+ *                      (Can be NULL)
+ * \param len           Length of personalization data
  *
- * \todo                Use entropy callback rather than buffer.
+ * \note                The "security strength" as defined by NIST is set to:
+ *                      128 bits if md_alg is SHA-1,
+ *                      192 bits if md_alg is SHA-224,
+ *                      256 bits if md_alg is SHA-256 or higher.
+ *                      Note that SHA-256 is just as efficient as SHA-224.
  *
  * \return              0 if successful, or
  *                      POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA, or
- *                      POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED
+ *                      POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED, or
+ *                      POLARSSL_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED.
  */
 int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+                    const md_info_t * md_info,
+                    int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                    void *p_entropy,
+                    const unsigned char *custom,
+                    size_t len );
+
+/**
+ * \brief               Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation.
+ *                      (For use with deterministic ECDSA.)
+ *
+ * \param ctx           HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised
+ * \param md_info       MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG
+ * \param data          Concatenation of entropy string and additional data
+ * \param data_len      Length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * \return              0 if successful, or
+ *                      POLARSSL_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA, or
+ *                      POLARSSL_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED.
+ */
+int hmac_drbg_init_buf( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
                         const md_info_t * md_info,
                         const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len );
 

library/ecdsa.c

@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int ecdsa_sign_det( ecp_group *grp, mpi *r, mpi *s,
     MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
     MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
     MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
-    hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
+    hmac_drbg_init_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
 
     ret = ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
                       hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );

library/hmac_drbg.c

@@ -63,9 +63,9 @@ void hmac_drbg_update( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
 }
 
 /*
- * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation.
+ * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA)
  */
-int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+int hmac_drbg_init_buf( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
                         const md_info_t * md_info,
                         const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len )
 {
@@ -84,6 +84,78 @@ int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
     return( 0 );
 }
 
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG initialisation
+ */
+int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+                    const md_info_t * md_info,
+                    int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+                    void *p_entropy,
+                    const unsigned char *custom,
+                    size_t len )
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned char seed[HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
+    size_t seedlen, init_entropy_len;
+
+    memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( hmac_drbg_context ) );
+
+    if( ( ret = md_init_ctx( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info ) ) != 0 )
+        return( ret );
+
+    /*
+     * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by
+     * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2,
+     * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength.
+     */
+    ctx->entropy_len = md_info->size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 */
+                       md_info->size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 */
+                                             32;  /* better (256+) -> 256 */
+
+    ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy;
+    ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy;
+
+    /*
+     * For initialisation, use more entropy to emulate a nonce
+     */
+    init_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2;
+
+    if( init_entropy_len + len > HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
+        return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG );
+
+    memset( seed, 0, HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT );
+
+    /*
+     * Gather init_entropy_len bytes of entropy for initial seed
+     */
+    if( 0 != ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed,
+                             init_entropy_len ) )
+    {
+        return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
+    }
+
+    seedlen = init_entropy_len;
+
+    /*
+     * Add additional data
+     */
+    if( custom != NULL && len != 0 )
+    {
+        memcpy( seed + seedlen, custom, len );
+        seedlen += len;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Set initial state and update it with initialisation data
+     */
+    memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_info->size );
+    /* ctx->K is already 0 */
+
+    hmac_drbg_update( ctx, seed, seedlen );
+
+    return( 0 );
+}
+
 /*
  * HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data (10.1.2.5)
  */