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polarssl/tests/compat.sh
Yanray Wang 20fa2ae220 Redesign translation of cipher suite names in compat.sh 
Move translation of cipher suite names after filter_ciphersuites
so that filter is based on standard cipher suite names.
Furthermore, an additional flag is passed to run_client to
determine the type of translation of cipher suite names.
Therefore, client receives cipher suite names based on
its naming convention but the reporting output is still
the standard cipher suite names.

Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang <yanray.wang@arm.com>
2023-01-17 15:11:46 +08:00

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#!/bin/sh
# compat.sh
#
# Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
#
# Purpose
#
# Test interoperbility with OpenSSL, GnuTLS as well as itself.
#
# Check each common ciphersuite, with each version, both ways (client/server),
# with and without client authentication.
set -u
# Limit the size of each log to 10 GiB, in case of failures with this script
# where it may output seemingly unlimited length error logs.
ulimit -f 20971520
# initialise counters
TESTS=0
FAILED=0
SKIPPED=0
SRVMEM=0
# default commands, can be overridden by the environment
: ${M_SRV:=../programs/ssl/ssl_server2}
: ${M_CLI:=../programs/ssl/ssl_client2}
: ${OPENSSL:=openssl}
: ${GNUTLS_CLI:=gnutls-cli}
: ${GNUTLS_SERV:=gnutls-serv}
# The OPENSSL variable used to be OPENSSL_CMD for historical reasons.
# To help the migration, error out if the old variable is set,
# but only if it has a different value than the new one.
if [ "${OPENSSL_CMD+set}" = set ]; then
# the variable is set, we can now check its value
if [ "$OPENSSL_CMD" != "$OPENSSL" ]; then
echo "Please use OPENSSL instead of OPENSSL_CMD." >&2
exit 125
fi
fi
# do we have a recent enough GnuTLS?
if ( which $GNUTLS_CLI && which $GNUTLS_SERV ) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
G_VER="$( $GNUTLS_CLI --version | head -n1 )"
if echo "$G_VER" | grep '@VERSION@' > /dev/null; then # git version
PEER_GNUTLS=" GnuTLS"
else
eval $( echo $G_VER | sed 's/.* \([0-9]*\)\.\([0-9]\)*\.\([0-9]*\)$/MAJOR="\1" MINOR="\2" PATCH="\3"/' )
if [ $MAJOR -lt 3 -o \
\( $MAJOR -eq 3 -a $MINOR -lt 2 \) -o \
\( $MAJOR -eq 3 -a $MINOR -eq 2 -a $PATCH -lt 15 \) ]
then
PEER_GNUTLS=""
else
PEER_GNUTLS=" GnuTLS"
if [ $MINOR -lt 4 ]; then
GNUTLS_MINOR_LT_FOUR='x'
fi
fi
fi
else
PEER_GNUTLS=""
fi
# default values for options
# /!\ keep this synchronised with:
# - basic-build-test.sh
# - all.sh (multiple components)
MODES="tls12 dtls12"
VERIFIES="NO YES"
TYPES="ECDSA RSA PSK"
FILTER=""
# By default, exclude:
# - NULL: excluded from our default config + requires OpenSSL legacy
# - ARIA: requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.1
# - ChachaPoly: requires OpenSSL >= 1.1.0
EXCLUDE='NULL\|ARIA\|CHACHA20_POLY1305'
VERBOSE=""
MEMCHECK=0
PEERS="OpenSSL$PEER_GNUTLS mbedTLS"
# hidden option: skip DTLS with OpenSSL
# (travis CI has a version that doesn't work for us)
: ${OSSL_NO_DTLS:=0}
print_usage() {
echo "Usage: $0"
printf " -h|--help\tPrint this help.\n"
printf " -f|--filter\tOnly matching ciphersuites are tested (Default: '%s')\n" "$FILTER"
printf " -e|--exclude\tMatching ciphersuites are excluded (Default: '%s')\n" "$EXCLUDE"
printf " -m|--modes\tWhich modes to perform (Default: '%s')\n" "$MODES"
printf " -t|--types\tWhich key exchange type to perform (Default: '%s')\n" "$TYPES"
printf " -V|--verify\tWhich verification modes to perform (Default: '%s')\n" "$VERIFIES"
printf " -p|--peers\tWhich peers to use (Default: '%s')\n" "$PEERS"
printf " \tAlso available: GnuTLS (needs v3.2.15 or higher)\n"
printf " -M|--memcheck\tCheck memory leaks and errors.\n"
printf " -v|--verbose\tSet verbose output.\n"
}
get_options() {
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
-f|--filter)
shift; FILTER=$1
;;
-e|--exclude)
shift; EXCLUDE=$1
;;
-m|--modes)
shift; MODES=$1
;;
-t|--types)
shift; TYPES=$1
;;
-V|--verify)
shift; VERIFIES=$1
;;
-p|--peers)
shift; PEERS=$1
;;
-v|--verbose)
VERBOSE=1
;;
-M|--memcheck)
MEMCHECK=1
;;
-h|--help)
print_usage
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown argument: '$1'"
print_usage
exit 1
;;
esac
shift
done
# sanitize some options (modes checked later)
VERIFIES="$( echo $VERIFIES | tr [a-z] [A-Z] )"
TYPES="$( echo $TYPES | tr [a-z] [A-Z] )"
}
log() {
if [ "X" != "X$VERBOSE" ]; then
echo ""
echo "$@"
fi
}
# is_dtls <mode>
is_dtls()
{
test "$1" = "dtls12"
}
# minor_ver <mode>
minor_ver()
{
case "$1" in
tls12|dtls12)
echo 3
;;
*)
echo "error: invalid mode: $MODE" >&2
# exiting is no good here, typically called in a subshell
echo -1
esac
}
filter()
{
LIST="$1"
NEW_LIST=""
EXCLMODE="$EXCLUDE"
for i in $LIST;
do
NEW_LIST="$NEW_LIST $( echo "$i" | grep "$FILTER" | grep -v "$EXCLMODE" )"
done
# normalize whitespace
echo "$NEW_LIST" | sed -e 's/[[:space:]][[:space:]]*/ /g' -e 's/^ //' -e 's/ $//'
}
# OpenSSL 1.0.1h with -Verify wants a ClientCertificate message even for
# PSK ciphersuites with DTLS, which is incorrect, so disable them for now
check_openssl_server_bug()
{
if test "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" && is_dtls "$MODE" && \
echo "$1" | grep "^TLS_PSK" >/dev/null;
then
SKIP_NEXT="YES"
fi
}
filter_ciphersuites()
{
if [ "X" != "X$FILTER" -o "X" != "X$EXCLUDE" ];
then
# Ciphersuite for mbed TLS
M_CIPHERS=$( filter "$M_CIPHERS" )
# Ciphersuite for OpenSSL
O_CIPHERS=$( filter "$O_CIPHERS" )
# Ciphersuite for GnuTLS
G_CIPHERS=$( filter "$G_CIPHERS" )
fi
# For GnuTLS client -> mbed TLS server,
# we need to force IPv4 by connecting to 127.0.0.1 but then auth fails
if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ] && is_dtls "$MODE"; then
G_CIPHERS=""
fi
}
reset_ciphersuites()
{
M_CIPHERS=""
O_CIPHERS=""
G_CIPHERS=""
}
check_translation()
{
if [ $1 -ne 0 ]; then
echo "translate_ciphers.py failed with exit code $1" >&2
echo "$2" >&2
exit 1
fi
}
# Ciphersuites that can be used with all peers.
# Since we currently have three possible peers, each ciphersuite should appear
# three times: in each peer's list (with the name that this peer uses).
add_common_ciphersuites()
{
CIPHERS=""
case $TYPE in
"ECDSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA \
"
;;
"RSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA \
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
"
;;
"PSK")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
"
;;
esac
O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
}
# Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS and OpenSSL
# A list of ciphersuites in the standard naming convention is appended
# to the list of Mbed TLS ciphersuites $M_CIPHERS and
# to the list of OpenSSL ciphersuites $O_CIPHERS respectively.
# Based on client's naming convention, all ciphersuite names will be
# translated into another naming format before sent to the client.
#
# NOTE: for some reason RSA-PSK doesn't work with OpenSSL,
# so RSA-PSK ciphersuites need to go in other sections, see
# https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/1419
#
# ChachaPoly suites are here rather than in "common", as they were added in
# GnuTLS in 3.5.0 and the CI only has 3.4.x so far.
add_openssl_ciphersuites()
{
CIPHERS=""
case $TYPE in
"ECDSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
"
;;
"RSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
"
;;
"PSK")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
"
;;
esac
O_CIPHERS="$O_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
}
# Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS and GnuTLS
# A list of ciphersuites in the standard naming convention is appended
# to the list of Mbed TLS ciphersuites $M_CIPHERS and
# to the list of GnuTLS ciphersuites $G_CIPHERS respectively.
# Based on client's naming convention, all ciphersuite names will be
# translated into another naming format before sent to the client.
add_gnutls_ciphersuites()
{
CIPHERS=""
case $TYPE in
"ECDSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
"
;;
"RSA")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
"
;;
"PSK")
CIPHERS="$CIPHERS \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 \
"
;;
esac
G_CIPHERS="$G_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS $CIPHERS"
}
# Ciphersuites usable only with Mbed TLS (not currently supported by another
# peer usable in this script). This provides only very rudimentaty testing, as
# this is not interop testing, but it's better than nothing.
add_mbedtls_ciphersuites()
{
case $TYPE in
"ECDSA")
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
"
;;
"RSA")
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
"
;;
"PSK")
# *PSK_NULL_SHA suites supported by GnuTLS 3.3.5 but not 3.2.15
M_CIPHERS="$M_CIPHERS \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA \
TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 \
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA \
"
;;
esac
}
setup_arguments()
{
O_MODE=""
G_MODE=""
case "$MODE" in
"tls12")
O_MODE="tls1_2"
G_PRIO_MODE="+VERS-TLS1.2"
;;
"dtls12")
O_MODE="dtls1_2"
G_PRIO_MODE="+VERS-DTLS1.2"
G_MODE="-u"
;;
*)
echo "error: invalid mode: $MODE" >&2
exit 1;
esac
# GnuTLS < 3.4 will choke if we try to allow CCM-8
if [ -z "${GNUTLS_MINOR_LT_FOUR-}" ]; then
G_PRIO_CCM="+AES-256-CCM-8:+AES-128-CCM-8:"
else
G_PRIO_CCM=""
fi
M_SERVER_ARGS="server_port=$PORT server_addr=0.0.0.0 force_version=$MODE"
O_SERVER_ARGS="-accept $PORT -cipher NULL,ALL -$O_MODE"
G_SERVER_ARGS="-p $PORT --http $G_MODE"
G_SERVER_PRIO="NORMAL:${G_PRIO_CCM}+NULL:+MD5:+PSK:+DHE-PSK:+ECDHE-PSK:+SHA256:+SHA384:+RSA-PSK:-VERS-TLS-ALL:$G_PRIO_MODE"
# The default prime for `openssl s_server` depends on the version:
# * OpenSSL <= 1.0.2a: 512-bit
# * OpenSSL 1.0.2b to 1.1.1b: 1024-bit
# * OpenSSL >= 1.1.1c: 2048-bit
# Mbed TLS wants >=1024, so force that for older versions. Don't force
# it for newer versions, which reject a 1024-bit prime. Indifferently
# force it or not for intermediate versions.
case $($OPENSSL version) in
"OpenSSL 1.0"*)
O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -dhparam data_files/dhparams.pem"
;;
esac
# with OpenSSL 1.0.1h, -www, -WWW and -HTTP break DTLS handshakes
if is_dtls "$MODE"; then
O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS"
else
O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -www"
fi
M_CLIENT_ARGS="server_port=$PORT server_addr=127.0.0.1 force_version=$MODE"
O_CLIENT_ARGS="-connect localhost:$PORT -$O_MODE"
G_CLIENT_ARGS="-p $PORT --debug 3 $G_MODE"
G_CLIENT_PRIO="NONE:$G_PRIO_MODE:+COMP-NULL:+CURVE-ALL:+SIGN-ALL"
# Newer versions of OpenSSL have a syntax to enable all "ciphers", even
# low-security ones. This covers not just cipher suites but also protocol
# versions. It is necessary, for example, to use (D)TLS 1.0/1.1 on
# OpenSSL 1.1.1f from Ubuntu 20.04. The syntax was only introduced in
# OpenSSL 1.1.0 (21e0c1d23afff48601eb93135defddae51f7e2e3) and I can't find
# a way to discover it from -help, so check the openssl version.
case $($OPENSSL version) in
"OpenSSL 0"*|"OpenSSL 1.0"*) :;;
*)
O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -cipher ALL@SECLEVEL=0"
O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -cipher ALL@SECLEVEL=0"
;;
esac
if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ];
then
M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt auth_mode=required"
O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt -Verify 10"
G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt --require-client-cert"
M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt auth_mode=required"
O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -CAfile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt -verify 10"
G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --x509cafile data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt"
else
# don't request a client cert at all
M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS ca_file=none auth_mode=none"
G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --disable-client-cert"
M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS ca_file=none auth_mode=none"
O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS"
G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --insecure"
fi
case $TYPE in
"ECDSA")
M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS crt_file=data_files/server5.crt key_file=data_files/server5.key"
O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -cert data_files/server5.crt -key data_files/server5.key"
G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server5.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server5.key"
if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ]; then
M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=data_files/server6.crt key_file=data_files/server6.key"
O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -cert data_files/server6.crt -key data_files/server6.key"
G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server6.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server6.key"
else
M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=none key_file=none"
fi
;;
"RSA")
M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key"
O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key"
G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key"
if [ "X$VERIFY" = "XYES" ]; then
M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=data_files/cert_sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server1.key"
O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -cert data_files/cert_sha256.crt -key data_files/server1.key"
G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/cert_sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server1.key"
else
M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS crt_file=none key_file=none"
fi
;;
"PSK")
# give RSA-PSK-capable server a RSA cert
# (should be a separate type, but harder to close with openssl)
M_SERVER_ARGS="$M_SERVER_ARGS psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 ca_file=none crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key"
O_SERVER_ARGS="$O_SERVER_ARGS -psk 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 -nocert"
G_SERVER_ARGS="$G_SERVER_ARGS --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --pskpasswd data_files/passwd.psk"
M_CLIENT_ARGS="$M_CLIENT_ARGS psk=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 crt_file=none key_file=none"
O_CLIENT_ARGS="$O_CLIENT_ARGS -psk 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70"
G_CLIENT_ARGS="$G_CLIENT_ARGS --pskusername Client_identity --pskkey=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70"
;;
esac
}
# is_mbedtls <cmd_line>
is_mbedtls() {
echo "$1" | grep 'ssl_server2\|ssl_client2' > /dev/null
}
# has_mem_err <log_file_name>
has_mem_err() {
if ( grep -F 'All heap blocks were freed -- no leaks are possible' "$1" &&
grep -F 'ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors from 0 contexts' "$1" ) > /dev/null
then
return 1 # false: does not have errors
else
return 0 # true: has errors
fi
}
# Wait for process $2 to be listening on port $1
if type lsof >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
wait_server_start() {
START_TIME=$(date +%s)
if is_dtls "$MODE"; then
proto=UDP
else
proto=TCP
fi
while ! lsof -a -n -b -i "$proto:$1" -p "$2" >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; do
if [ $(( $(date +%s) - $START_TIME )) -gt $DOG_DELAY ]; then
echo "SERVERSTART TIMEOUT"
echo "SERVERSTART TIMEOUT" >> $SRV_OUT
break
fi
# Linux and *BSD support decimal arguments to sleep. On other
# OSes this may be a tight loop.
sleep 0.1 2>/dev/null || true
done
}
else
echo "Warning: lsof not available, wait_server_start = sleep"
wait_server_start() {
sleep 2
}
fi
# start_server <name>
# also saves name and command
start_server() {
case $1 in
[Oo]pen*)
SERVER_CMD="$OPENSSL s_server $O_SERVER_ARGS"
;;
[Gg]nu*)
SERVER_CMD="$GNUTLS_SERV $G_SERVER_ARGS --priority $G_SERVER_PRIO"
;;
mbed*)
SERVER_CMD="$M_SRV $M_SERVER_ARGS"
if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
SERVER_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $SERVER_CMD"
fi
;;
*)
echo "error: invalid server name: $1" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
SERVER_NAME=$1
log "$SERVER_CMD"
echo "$SERVER_CMD" > $SRV_OUT
# for servers without -www or equivalent
while :; do echo bla; sleep 1; done | $SERVER_CMD >> $SRV_OUT 2>&1 &
PROCESS_ID=$!
wait_server_start "$PORT" "$PROCESS_ID"
}
# terminate the running server
stop_server() {
kill $PROCESS_ID 2>/dev/null
wait $PROCESS_ID 2>/dev/null
if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
if is_mbedtls "$SERVER_CMD" && has_mem_err $SRV_OUT; then
echo " ! Server had memory errors"
SRVMEM=$(( $SRVMEM + 1 ))
return
fi
fi
rm -f $SRV_OUT
}
# kill the running server (used when killed by signal)
cleanup() {
rm -f $SRV_OUT $CLI_OUT
kill $PROCESS_ID >/dev/null 2>&1
kill $WATCHDOG_PID >/dev/null 2>&1
exit 1
}
# wait for client to terminate and set EXIT
# must be called right after starting the client
wait_client_done() {
CLI_PID=$!
( sleep "$DOG_DELAY"; echo "TIMEOUT" >> $CLI_OUT; kill $CLI_PID ) &
WATCHDOG_PID=$!
wait $CLI_PID
EXIT=$?
kill $WATCHDOG_PID
wait $WATCHDOG_PID
echo "EXIT: $EXIT" >> $CLI_OUT
}
# run_client <name> <cipher>
run_client() {
# announce what we're going to do
TESTS=$(( $TESTS + 1 ))
VERIF=$(echo $VERIFY | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
TITLE="`echo $1 | head -c1`->`echo $SERVER_NAME | head -c1`"
TITLE="$TITLE $MODE,$VERIF $2"
printf "%s " "$TITLE"
LEN=$(( 72 - `echo "$TITLE" | wc -c` ))
for i in `seq 1 $LEN`; do printf '.'; done; printf ' '
# Translate ciphersuite names based on client's naming convention
t_cipher=$(./scripts/translate_ciphers.py $3 $2)
check_translation $? "$t_cipher"
# should we skip?
if [ "X$SKIP_NEXT" = "XYES" ]; then
SKIP_NEXT="NO"
echo "SKIP"
SKIPPED=$(( $SKIPPED + 1 ))
return
fi
# run the command and interpret result
case $1 in
[Oo]pen*)
CLIENT_CMD="$OPENSSL s_client $O_CLIENT_ARGS -cipher $t_cipher"
log "$CLIENT_CMD"
echo "$CLIENT_CMD" > $CLI_OUT
printf 'GET HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n' | $CLIENT_CMD >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 &
wait_client_done
if [ $EXIT -eq 0 ]; then
RESULT=0
else
# If the cipher isn't supported...
if grep 'Cipher is (NONE)' $CLI_OUT >/dev/null; then
RESULT=1
else
RESULT=2
fi
fi
;;
[Gg]nu*)
# need to force IPv4 with UDP, but keep localhost for auth
if is_dtls "$MODE"; then
G_HOST="127.0.0.1"
else
G_HOST="localhost"
fi
CLIENT_CMD="$GNUTLS_CLI $G_CLIENT_ARGS --priority $G_PRIO_MODE:$t_cipher $G_HOST"
log "$CLIENT_CMD"
echo "$CLIENT_CMD" > $CLI_OUT
printf 'GET HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n' | $CLIENT_CMD >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 &
wait_client_done
if [ $EXIT -eq 0 ]; then
RESULT=0
else
RESULT=2
# interpret early failure, with a handshake_failure alert
# before the server hello, as "no ciphersuite in common"
if grep -F 'Received alert [40]: Handshake failed' $CLI_OUT; then
if grep -i 'SERVER HELLO .* was received' $CLI_OUT; then :
else
RESULT=1
fi
fi >/dev/null
fi
;;
mbed*)
CLIENT_CMD="$M_CLI $M_CLIENT_ARGS force_ciphersuite=$t_cipher"
if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
CLIENT_CMD="valgrind --leak-check=full $CLIENT_CMD"
fi
log "$CLIENT_CMD"
echo "$CLIENT_CMD" > $CLI_OUT
$CLIENT_CMD >> $CLI_OUT 2>&1 &
wait_client_done
case $EXIT in
# Success
"0") RESULT=0 ;;
# Ciphersuite not supported
"2") RESULT=1 ;;
# Error
*) RESULT=2 ;;
esac
if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
if is_mbedtls "$CLIENT_CMD" && has_mem_err $CLI_OUT; then
RESULT=2
fi
fi
;;
*)
echo "error: invalid client name: $1" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
echo "EXIT: $EXIT" >> $CLI_OUT
# report and count result
case $RESULT in
"0")
echo PASS
;;
"1")
echo SKIP
SKIPPED=$(( $SKIPPED + 1 ))
;;
"2")
echo FAIL
cp $SRV_OUT c-srv-${TESTS}.log
cp $CLI_OUT c-cli-${TESTS}.log
echo " ! outputs saved to c-srv-${TESTS}.log, c-cli-${TESTS}.log"
if [ "${LOG_FAILURE_ON_STDOUT:-0}" != 0 ]; then
echo " ! server output:"
cat c-srv-${TESTS}.log
echo " ! ==================================================="
echo " ! client output:"
cat c-cli-${TESTS}.log
fi
FAILED=$(( $FAILED + 1 ))
;;
esac
rm -f $CLI_OUT
}
#
# MAIN
#
if cd $( dirname $0 ); then :; else
echo "cd $( dirname $0 ) failed" >&2
exit 1
fi
get_options "$@"
# sanity checks, avoid an avalanche of errors
if [ ! -x "$M_SRV" ]; then
echo "Command '$M_SRV' is not an executable file" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ ! -x "$M_CLI" ]; then
echo "Command '$M_CLI' is not an executable file" >&2
exit 1
fi
if echo "$PEERS" | grep -i openssl > /dev/null; then
if which "$OPENSSL" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else
echo "Command '$OPENSSL' not found" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
if echo "$PEERS" | grep -i gnutls > /dev/null; then
for CMD in "$GNUTLS_CLI" "$GNUTLS_SERV"; do
if which "$CMD" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else
echo "Command '$CMD' not found" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
fi
for PEER in $PEERS; do
case "$PEER" in
mbed*|[Oo]pen*|[Gg]nu*)
;;
*)
echo "Unknown peers: $PEER" >&2
exit 1
esac
done
# Pick a "unique" port in the range 10000-19999.
PORT="0000$$"
PORT="1$(echo $PORT | tail -c 5)"
# Also pick a unique name for intermediate files
SRV_OUT="srv_out.$$"
CLI_OUT="cli_out.$$"
# client timeout delay: be more patient with valgrind
if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
DOG_DELAY=30
else
DOG_DELAY=10
fi
SKIP_NEXT="NO"
trap cleanup INT TERM HUP
for VERIFY in $VERIFIES; do
for MODE in $MODES; do
for TYPE in $TYPES; do
for PEER in $PEERS; do
setup_arguments
case "$PEER" in
[Oo]pen*)
if test "$OSSL_NO_DTLS" -gt 0 && is_dtls "$MODE"; then
continue;
fi
# OpenSSL <1.0.2 doesn't support DTLS 1.2. Check if OpenSSL
# supports $O_MODE from the s_server help. (The s_client
# help isn't accurate as of 1.0.2g: it supports DTLS 1.2
# but doesn't list it. But the s_server help seems to be
# accurate.)
if ! $OPENSSL s_server -help 2>&1 | grep -q "^ *-$O_MODE "; then
continue;
fi
reset_ciphersuites
add_common_ciphersuites
add_openssl_ciphersuites
filter_ciphersuites
if [ "X" != "X$M_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "OpenSSL"
for i in $M_CIPHERS; do
check_openssl_server_bug $i
run_client mbedTLS $i m
done
stop_server
fi
if [ "X" != "X$O_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "mbedTLS"
for i in $O_CIPHERS; do
run_client OpenSSL $i o
done
stop_server
fi
;;
[Gg]nu*)
reset_ciphersuites
add_common_ciphersuites
add_gnutls_ciphersuites
filter_ciphersuites
if [ "X" != "X$M_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "GnuTLS"
for i in $M_CIPHERS; do
run_client mbedTLS $i m
done
stop_server
fi
if [ "X" != "X$G_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "mbedTLS"
for i in $G_CIPHERS; do
run_client GnuTLS $i g
done
stop_server
fi
;;
mbed*)
reset_ciphersuites
add_common_ciphersuites
add_openssl_ciphersuites
add_gnutls_ciphersuites
add_mbedtls_ciphersuites
filter_ciphersuites
if [ "X" != "X$M_CIPHERS" ]; then
start_server "mbedTLS"
for i in $M_CIPHERS; do
run_client mbedTLS $i m
done
stop_server
fi
;;
*)
echo "Unknown peer: $PEER" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
done
done
done
done
echo "------------------------------------------------------------------------"
if [ $FAILED -ne 0 -o $SRVMEM -ne 0 ];
then
printf "FAILED"
else
printf "PASSED"
fi
if [ "$MEMCHECK" -gt 0 ]; then
MEMREPORT=", $SRVMEM server memory errors"
else
MEMREPORT=""
fi
PASSED=$(( $TESTS - $FAILED ))
echo " ($PASSED / $TESTS tests ($SKIPPED skipped$MEMREPORT))"
FAILED=$(( $FAILED + $SRVMEM ))
exit $FAILED
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