 84d9c625bf
			
		
	
	
		84d9c625bf
		
	
	
	
	
		
			
			- Fix for possible unset uid/gid in toproto
 - Fix for default mtree style
 - Update libelf
 - Importing libexecinfo
 - Resynchronize GCC, mpc, gmp, mpfr
 - build.sh: Replace params with show-params.
     This has been done as the make target has been renamed in the same
     way, while a new target named params has been added. This new
     target generates a file containing all the parameters, instead of
     printing it on the console.
 - Update test48 with new etc/services (Fix by Ben Gras <ben@minix3.org)
     get getservbyport() out of the inner loop
Change-Id: Ie6ad5226fa2621ff9f0dee8782ea48f9443d2091
		
	
			
		
			
				
	
	
		
			199 lines
		
	
	
		
			6.3 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			199 lines
		
	
	
		
			6.3 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| /* $NetBSD: crypt-sha1.c,v 1.8 2013/08/28 17:47:07 riastradh Exp $ */
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| 
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| /*
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|  * Copyright (c) 2004, Juniper Networks, Inc.
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|  * All rights reserved.
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|  * 
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|  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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|  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
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|  * are met: 
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|  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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|  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
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|  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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|  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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|  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.  
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|  * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holders nor the names of its
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|  *    contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
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|  *    from this software without specific prior written permission. 
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|  * 
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|  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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|  * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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|  * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
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|  * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
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|  * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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|  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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|  * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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|  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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|  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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|  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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|  * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 
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|  */
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| 
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| #include <sys/cdefs.h>
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| #if !defined(lint)
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| __RCSID("$NetBSD: crypt-sha1.c,v 1.8 2013/08/28 17:47:07 riastradh Exp $");
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| #endif /* not lint */
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| 
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| #include <stdlib.h>
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| #include <unistd.h>
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| #include <stdio.h>
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| #include <string.h>
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| #include <time.h>
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| 
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| #include <err.h>
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| #include "crypt.h"
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| 
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| /*
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|  * The default iterations - should take >0s on a fast CPU
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|  * but not be insane for a slow CPU.
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|  */
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| #ifndef CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS
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| # define CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS 24680
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| #endif
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| /*
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|  * Support a reasonably? long salt.
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|  */
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| #ifndef CRYPT_SHA1_SALT_LENGTH
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| # define CRYPT_SHA1_SALT_LENGTH 64
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| #endif
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| 
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| /*
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|  * This may be called from crypt_sha1 or gensalt.
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|  *
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|  * The value returned will be slightly less than <hint> which defaults
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|  * to 24680.  The goals are that the number of iterations should take
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|  * non-zero amount of time on a fast cpu while not taking insanely
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|  * long on a slow cpu.  The current default will take about 5 seconds
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|  * on a 100MHz sparc, and about 0.04 seconds on a 3GHz i386.
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|  * The number is varied to frustrate those attempting to generate a
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|  * dictionary of pre-computed hashes.
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|  */
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| unsigned int
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| __crypt_sha1_iterations (unsigned int hint)
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| {
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|     static int once = 1;
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * We treat CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS as a hint.
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|      * Make it harder for someone to pre-compute hashes for a
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|      * dictionary attack by not using the same iteration count for
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|      * every entry.
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|      */
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| 
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|     if (once) {
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| 	int pid = getpid();
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| 	
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| 	srandom(time(NULL) ^ (pid * pid));
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| 	once = 0;
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|     }
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|     if (hint == 0)
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| 	hint = CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS;
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|     return hint - (random() % (hint / 4));
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| }
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| 
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| /*
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|  * UNIX password using hmac_sha1
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|  * This is PBKDF1 from RFC 2898, but using hmac_sha1.
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|  *
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|  * The format of the encrypted password is:
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|  * $<tag>$<iterations>$<salt>$<digest>
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|  *
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|  * where:
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|  * 	<tag>		is "sha1"
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|  *	<iterations>	is an unsigned int identifying how many rounds
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|  * 			have been applied to <digest>.  The number
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|  * 			should vary slightly for each password to make
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|  * 			it harder to generate a dictionary of
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|  * 			pre-computed hashes.  See crypt_sha1_iterations.
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|  * 	<salt>		up to 64 bytes of random data, 8 bytes is
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|  * 			currently considered more than enough.
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|  *	<digest>	the hashed password.
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|  *
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|  * NOTE:
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|  * To be FIPS 140 compliant, the password which is used as a hmac key,
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|  * should be between 10 and 20 characters to provide at least 80bits
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|  * strength, and avoid the need to hash it before using as the 
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|  * hmac key.
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|  */
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| char *
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| __crypt_sha1 (const char *pw, const char *salt)
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| {
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|     static const char *magic = SHA1_MAGIC;
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|     static unsigned char hmac_buf[SHA1_SIZE];
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|     static char passwd[(2 * sizeof(SHA1_MAGIC)) +
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| 		       CRYPT_SHA1_SALT_LENGTH + SHA1_SIZE];
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|     const char *sp;
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|     char *ep;
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|     unsigned long ul;
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|     int sl;
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|     int pl;
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|     int dl;
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|     unsigned int iterations;
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|     unsigned int i;
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|     /* XXX silence -Wpointer-sign (would be nice to fix this some other way) */
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|     const unsigned char *pwu = (const unsigned char *)pw;
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Salt format is
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|      * $<tag>$<iterations>$salt[$]
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|      * If it does not start with $ we use our default iterations.
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|      */
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| 
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|     /* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */
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|     if (!strncmp(salt, magic, strlen(magic))) {
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| 	salt += strlen(magic);
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| 	/* and get the iteration count */
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| 	iterations = strtoul(salt, &ep, 10);
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| 	if (*ep != '$')
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| 	    return NULL;		/* invalid input */
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| 	salt = ep + 1;			/* skip over the '$' */
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|     } else {
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| 	iterations = __crypt_sha1_iterations(0);
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|     }
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| 
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|     /* It stops at the next '$', max CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS chars */
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|     for (sp = salt; *sp && *sp != '$' && sp < (salt + CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS); sp++)
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| 	continue;
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| 
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|     /* Get the length of the actual salt */
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|     sl = sp - salt;
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|     pl = strlen(pw);
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| 
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|     /*
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|      * Now get to work...
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|      * Prime the pump with <salt><magic><iterations>
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|      */
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|     dl = snprintf(passwd, sizeof (passwd), "%.*s%s%u", 
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| 		  sl, salt, magic, iterations);
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|     /*
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|      * Then hmac using <pw> as key, and repeat...
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|      */
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|     __hmac_sha1((unsigned char *)passwd, dl, pwu, pl, hmac_buf);
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|     for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
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| 	__hmac_sha1(hmac_buf, SHA1_SIZE, pwu, pl, hmac_buf);
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|     }
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|     /* Now output... */
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|     pl = snprintf(passwd, sizeof(passwd), "%s%u$%.*s$",
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| 		  magic, iterations, sl, salt);
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|     ep = passwd + pl;
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| 
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|     /* Every 3 bytes of hash gives 24 bits which is 4 base64 chars */
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|     for (i = 0; i < SHA1_SIZE - 3; i += 3) {
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| 	ul = (hmac_buf[i+0] << 16) |
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| 	    (hmac_buf[i+1] << 8) |
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| 	    hmac_buf[i+2];
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| 	__crypt_to64(ep, ul, 4); ep += 4;
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|     }
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|     /* Only 2 bytes left, so we pad with byte0 */
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|     ul = (hmac_buf[SHA1_SIZE - 2] << 16) |
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| 	(hmac_buf[SHA1_SIZE - 1] << 8) |
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| 	hmac_buf[0];
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|     __crypt_to64(ep, ul, 4); ep += 4;
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|     *ep = '\0';
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| 
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|     /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
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|     explicit_memset(hmac_buf, 0, sizeof hmac_buf);
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| 
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|     return passwd;
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| }	
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